This is the seventh in a series. The bulleted points below are culled from many sources. They are compiled to show how much information on an issue is available to those who are seeking it.
-
Two realities define the range of a meaningful debate on Iraq policy: The war cannot be ended by military means alone. But neither is it possible to “end” the war by ceding the battlefield, for the radical jihadist challenge knows no frontiers.
-
An abrupt withdrawal from Iraq will not end the war; it will only redirect it. Within Iraq, the sectarian conflict could assume genocidal proportions; terrorist base areas could re-emerge.
-
The proper troop level in Iraq will not be discovered by political compromise at home. An appropriate strategy for Iraq requires political direction. But the political dimension must be the ally of military strategy, not a resignation from it.
-
The argument that the mission of U.S. forces should be confined to defeating terrorism, protecting the frontiers, preventing the emergence of Taliban-like structures and staying out of the civil-war aspects is also tempting. In practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish among the various aspects of the conflict with any precision.
-
Some answer that the best political result is most likely to be achieved by total withdrawal. Nothing in Middle East history suggests that abdication confers influence.
-
Those who urge this course of action need to put forward what they recommend if the dire consequences of an abrupt withdrawal foreseen by the majority of experts and diplomats occurs.
-
In the end, political leaders will be held responsible – often by their publics, surely by history – not only for what they hoped but for what they should have feared.
-
The United States is now in Iraq in large part to serve the American commitment to global order and not as a favor to the Baghdad government. Many other nations know that their internal security and, in some cases, their survival will be affected by the outcome in Iraq and are bound to be concerned that they may all face unpredictable risks if the situation gets out of control.
-
That passivity of other nations cannot last. The best way for other countries to give effect to their concerns is to participate in the construction of a civil society. The best way for us to foster it is to turn reconstruction step-by-step into a cooperative international effort under multilateral management.
-
Whatever you think of the performance of Iraq’s national leaders, the notion that withdrawing U.S. troops will “shock” them into reconciliation is unsupported by evidence or experience. On the contrary, ordering a retreat will only serve to unravel the hard-fought gains that have been won.
-
The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq was unequivocal on this point: “Changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role”–the Petraeus strategy–“to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations”–which most congressional Democrats have been pressing for–“would erode security gains achieved thus far.” This judgment is echoed by our commanders on the ground.
-
If Washington politicians succeed in forcing a premature troop withdrawal in Iraq, the result will be a more dangerous world with our enemies emboldened. As Iran’s president recently crowed, “soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region… [and] we are prepared to fill the gap.”
-
Whatever the shortcomings of our friends in Iraq, they is no excuse for us to retreat from our enemies like al Qaeda and Iran, who pose a mortal threat to our vital national interests. We must understand that today in Iraq we are fighting and defeating the same terrorist network that attacked on 9/11.
-
As al Qaeda in Iraq continues to be hunted down and rooted out, and the Iraqi Army continues to improve, the U.S. footprint will no doubt adjust. But these adjustments should be left to the discretion of Gen. Petraeus, not forced on our troops by politicians in Washington with a 6,000-mile congressional screwdriver, and, perhaps, an eye on the 2008 election.
-
Withdraw U.S. military forces according to the security situation on the ground, not according to an artificial timetable. The United States has sacrificed too much blood and treasure in Iraq to squander its chances of victory with a rapid pullout that would jeopardize the survival of a stable democracy. Decisions about the timing of troop reductions should be made by the generals in Iraq, not imposed by politicians in Washington. The United States has a continued responsibility to help Iraqis get back on their feet and defeat the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime and Islamic extremists opposed to democracy.
-
Among Iraq’s neighbors, only the dictatorships in Iran and Syria want to see a rapid U.S. withdrawal, as both would stand to gain if the U.S. prematurely withdraws its forces from Iraq. Al-Qaeda would be free to set up bases for exporting terrorism to Iraq’s neighbors and other targets around the world. Iran would become the dominant outside influence in Iraq.
-
Finishing the job in Iraq by working to build a stable government that will be an ally in the war against al-Qaeda and help contain Iran will help the U.S. address future threats.
-
Where, in a new region of jihadist ascendancy, are troops to be redeployed to? Other Middle East countries? What Middle Eastern illegitimate autocrat would want to host a retreating and defeated American army, a sort of modern version of Xenophon’s orphaned Ten Thousand? Indeed, the problem would not be redeployment to a nearby host kingdom, but just maintaining Centcom forces where they are now, once the Arab Street smells blood and adjusts to an Islamic victory.
-
If IEDs worked in Iraq, why not also in Kuwait and Qatar?
